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LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT FOR
COMMERCIAL AIR SAFETY
BY CHARLES J. PETERSt
I. THE STATUTORY BASIS
THE STATUTORY BASIS for the legal responsibility of the federal
government for commercial air safety is provided by the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958.' A summary of the areas of federal responsibility
specified in that Act is readily available in portions of its section 103,
Declaration of Policy. Section 103 requires the administrator to consider
"as being in the public interest" (1) the regulation of air commerce to best
promote its safety, (2) the control of the use of the navigable airspace and
the regulation of both civil and military operations in such airspace in the
interest of the safety of both, and (3) the development and operation of
a common system of air traffic control and navigation for both military
and civil aircraft.' The principal sections of the Act dealing with the
safety regulatory responsibilities of the Federal Aviation Administrator are
section 307(a), authorizing and directing the adoption of airspace regu-
lations; section 307(c), authorizing and directing the adoption of air
traffic rules governing the flight of aircraft; and the several sections of
Title VI, authorizing and making it the duty of the administrator to
promote the safety of flight by prescribing minimum standards for air-
craft, aircraft engines, propellers, and appliances and authorizing the
issuance of certificates for airmen, aircraft, air carriers, and air agencies.'
In connection with these regulatory responsibilities, the administrator is
authorized by section 609 to suspend or revoke any safety certificate he
issues and to initiate enforcement action leading to civil penalties under
section 901 or criminal penalties under section 902 for violations of provi-
sions of the Act or his regulations.'
The installation and operation of a common system of air traffic con-
trol and navigation are authorized by section 307(b), empowering the
administrator to establish, operate, and maintain air navigation facilities.
The term "air navigation facility" is defined in broad, general language
by section 101(8) of the Act to include air traffic control towers and
air route traffic control centers. There is a very material difference between
this authorization to provide air traffic control services and air navigation
aids under section 307(b), and the legislative language on the rule
t Associate General Counsel, Litigation Division, Federal Aviation Administration.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 737-806, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1964).
' Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 103, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. S 1303 (1964).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 307, 601-07, 72 Stat. 749, 775-79, 49 U.S.C. 55 1348,
1421-27 (1964).4 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§ 609, 901-02, 72 Stat. 779, 783-84, 49 U.S.C. 5 1429,
1471-72 (1964).
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making, certification, and enforcement functions of the administrator.
The authorization granted the administrator to provide air traffic control
and air navigation services is not coupled with a mandatory directive in
the statute to do so, as his rule making functions are, but, rather, is
limited to an authorization only. In addition, activities under it are
expressly conditioned by the phrase in section 307(b) "within the limits
of available appropriations made by the Congress."
II. THE CASE LAW
While the statutory provisions governing the responsibility of the
federal government for air safety clearly delineate the functions involved,
the language used by the Congress is constantly being interpreted by the
cases arising from aircraft accidents. Accordingly, I will attempt to review
here the more significant judicial decisions involving the federal govern-
ment. The administrator's exercise of his rule making responsibility under
sections 307(a) and (c) and Title VI is occasionally the subject of a
lawsuit representing a petition for rule making or a petition for an
injunction to prevent rule making or the application of a rule. However,
there have been no noteworthy suits filed against the government seeking
money damages based upon the alleged negligence of an FAA employee in
the exercise of the administrator's rule making powers.
A few suits have been filed based upon the FAA performance of its
certification and enforcement responsibilities. Initially, the courts were
reluctant to conclude that the federal government was liable even though
the available evidence indicated the federal employee involved had not
performed his duties with complete perfection. The first of these cases
arose from the crash of an American Airlines aircraft at Fort Leonard
Wood, Missouri, on 4 August 1955. The accident was caused by an engine
failure due to improper overhaul at American's base in Tulsa at which the
Civil Aeronautics Administrations had stationed several aviation safety ag-
ents to monitor and inspect the air carrier's operations. The plaintiff alleged
negligence on the part of the CAA inspectors, and the United States
defended on the legal ground that the CAA inspectors owed no duty to
individual passengers and on the factual ground that the inspectors could
not physically check each operation of the carrier. The court held the air
carrier liable but concluded that, under both the law and facts, the
plaintiffs had failed to establish any basis for a recovery against the
United States.!
During this same period, the government was also successful in a
similar case involving the improper approval of a modification of a C-46
by a CAA-Designated Aircraft Maintenance Inspector (DAMI). The
DAMI had issued a certificate of airworthiness even though nonconform-
ing parts had been used in the modification of the elevator tab controls.
The aircraft crashed shortly after the modification and the Civil Aero-
nautics Board determined that the accident was caused by the structural
'A predecessor agency to the Federal Aviation Administration.
6Lee v. United States (N.D. Tex. 1957).
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failure of the wing from a violent pitch-down induced by the erratic
action of the nonconforming controls. The pilot's widow filed suit
against the government, but the court dismissed the action on the ground
that the government inspectors did not owe a duty to the plaintiff in
their performance of the statutory functions entrusted to the admini-
strator to inspect and certificate aircraft.!
In another airworthiness case,8 the claim against the government was
based on the alleged negligence of an agency inspector in issuing a certifi-
cate of airworthiness despite a lack of compliance with an airworthiness
directive. Here again, the United States was dismissed as a party in the
action.
The judicial view on the extent of the FAA duty to passengers was
again expressed in the case of Gibbs v. United States.! Plaintiff's decedent
was a passenger in a Twin Beech, operated by an air taxi operator, which
crashed on takeoff due to being overloaded and having the center of
gravity moved to the rear beyond the maximum allowable limit. The
plaintiff alleged that the government was negligent in certificating the pilot
and the airworthiness of the aircraft after modification and alteration. The
court first concluded that the distinction between the government's
negligence when it acts in a proprietary capacity and its negligence when
it acts in a governmental role no longer existed. The court then found
that the FAA inspector had apparently not made a sufficient inspection
to determine whether the modification was in conformity with the sup-
plemental type certificate and that there was a lack of proper coordination
between two FAA offices. While the court found this to be "culpable
negligence," it also found that the proximate cause of the accident was
the pilot error in overloading the aircraft and positioning the load so as
to violate the center of gravity limit. Thus, the court refused to allow
the plaintiff to recover from the government. The case is noteworthy for
its statement that "the Government nevertheless does not become an
insurer" because of its decision to regulate the flight, repair, and modifi-
cation of aircraft and the licensing of pilots. Instead, the court stated,
the liability of the government "is subject to the same requirements of
negligence and causation as would affect the liability of a private person
in the same circumstances.""
The extent of the government's responsibility for commercial air
safety in the certification of aircraft and related functions was the sub-
ject of suits resulting from the crash of a Lockheed Electra upon
encountering starlings at takeoff from Logan Airport in Boston on
4 October 1960. The court found the government negligent on the
following four grounds: (1) issuance of a type certificate for an aircraft
with engines capable of ingesting birds with a resulting loss of power;
(2) failure to prescribe in the type certificate a prohibition against use
of the aircraft where birds were known to congregate; (3) failure to
'Lohr v. United States, 264 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1959).
8Bremler v. Aerospace Co. (S.D. Cal. 1959).
9251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
.Id. at 400.
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devise a system under which aircraft would not be cleared for takeoff
where birds were of such quantity as to be a menace; and (4) failure to
require the airport operator, in the grant agreement made under the
Federal Airport Act, to remove conditions at the airport which attracted
birds." This decision is now on appeal in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit and, therefore, we shall refrain from any
discussion of (1) the problem presented to the FAA in the type certifi-
cation of aircraft with engines which may lose power due to foreign
object ingestion, and (2) the scope of the term "airport hazards," as used
in the Federal Airport Act and the implementing regulations."
A review of the judicial decisions involving the provision by the FAA
of air traffic control and related services presents a substantially more
complex picture than those involving other FAA functions. Before pro-
ceeding to that review, we might summarize the basic relationship which
exists between the FAA controller and the pilot in command of an air-
craft, together with their respective responsibilities and the sources of
those responsibilities. In the exercise of the statutory authorization to
operate air navigation facilities, the Federal Aviation Administrator
operates 28 air route control centers, 269 airport traffic control towers,
332 flight service stations, and 59 combined station towers. In operating
these facilities within the limits of available appropriations, the admin-
istrator has promulgated manuals of procedures which prescribe the
services to be provided the aviation public and the manner in which those
services are to be provided." Air traffic controllers, flight service spe-
cialists, and other FAA employees are instructed to perform their duties
in accordance with these handbooks. Thus, airport traffic control tower
operators may clear aircraft for takeoff or landing only in accordance
with prescribed separation standards and enroute air traffic controllers
are required to preserve fixed distances between enroute aircraft.
Similarly, the administrator, in accordance with the authorization and
mandate given by the Congress in sections 307 and 601 of the Act,
prescribes air traffic rules and related regulations governing pilots. 4 Under
these regulations, the pilot in command is "directly responsible for and
is the final authority as to the operation" of his aircraft." He is required,
before beginning a flight, to "familiarize himself with all available infor-
mation concerning that flight." This information must include available
weather reports and forecasts and alternatives available to him if the
planned flight cannot be completed." These air traffic rules include a
prohibition against careless or reckless operation and, also, flight rules on
the right of way and operations near other aircraft, imposing an obliga-
Rapp v. Eastern Airlines, 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
"FAA Aviation News, Mar. 1968.
's See, e.g., FAA Handbook, Terminal Air Traffic Control § 7110.8; En Route Air Traffic Con-
trol § 7110.9; Facility Operation § 7230.1.
14 14 C.F.R. § 91 et. seq. (1967).
'5 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1967).
1614 C.F.R. § 91.5 (1967).
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tion on each pilot to maintain a lookout for other aircraft, known as
the "see and be seen" or "see and avoid" responsibility."
With respect to the basic air traffic controller responsibility, i.e., the
separation of aircraft from each other, landmark decisions have been
handed down by the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal. In
United States v. Schultetus," the Fifth Circuit reviewed a trial court
decision holding the government responsible for a mid-air collision which
occurred in a control zone within view of the airport traffic controllers.
The decision for the plaintiffs was based on the controller's failure to
direct one pilot to alter his course and to properly space the other aircraft.
The appellate court found that the aircraft were operating in Visual Flight
Rules weather conditions and that the lower court had "overlooked the
principle that the direct and primary responsibility for the operation of
an aircraft over or in the vicinity of an airport rests upon the pilots of
the aircraft."1 The same result was reached in United States v. Miller.- The
case involved a similar mid-air collision between a Cessna in the traffic
pattern practicing landings and a Beechcraft entering the pattern. The
Ninth Circuit found that the Cessna had the right of way and concluded
that the failure of the Beechcraft pilot to comply with the air traffic rules
was not excused by the presence of the tower controllers and the issuance
of a clearance to enter the pattern. Referring to the trial court's conclu-
sion that the tower controllers were primarily responsible for the preven-
tion of collisions, the court stated: "Such a view would be erroneous,
because the focal point of ultimate responsibility for the safe operation
of aircraft under VFR weather conditions rests with the pilot. Under such
conditions he is obligated to observe and avoid other traffic, even if he is
flying with a traffic clearance.""1
Another control zone mid-air collision case arose when a formation
of National Guard F-84's made a low pass across the airport in accordance
with an air traffic clearance, and one of the jets collided with a Piper
Tri-Pacer, killing both occupants.2 The Piper had entered the control
zone without advising the tower of its presence or obtaining any clearance
or traffic information. While the court first found that the controller was
not negligent in failing to observe the Piper, it also concluded that the
advisory nature of the control tower function and the collision avoidance
responsibility of the pilots precluded recovery against the government.
On the same subject of traffic separation, the Fourth Circuit reversed a
judgment for the plaintiff who had sought damages for injuries suffered
as a passenger in a DC-8 which had skidded off a runway. The incident
occurred when the pilot was attempting to turn in accordance with an
ATC instruction.' While the basis for government liability was extremely
scanty, the decision is noteworthy for its recognition of the mandatory
17 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.9, 91,65, 91.67, 91.69 (1967).
18277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1960).
'9Id. at 328.
20 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962).
21 1 d. at 710.
2Stanley v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
23 Tilley v. United States, 375 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1967).
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application of the administrator's air traffic control procedures to con-
trollers and the scope of the air traffic rules which make the pilot pri-
marily responsible for the operation of his aircraft.
Another control zone traffic separation case involving possible negligence
of a tower controller arose from the collision of a landing helicopter with
a truck traversing a terminal gate area. 4 While the helicopter was pro-
ceeding under an appropriate clearance, the court nevertheless found the
pilot negligent in failing to survey the landing area and, accordingly,
denied recovery when the plaintiff failed to prove his freedom from
contributory negligence.
The government is, of course, not always successful in litigation arising
from near misses or mid-air collisions. In Cattaro v. Northwest Airlines
&4 United States," the court held the government responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger in a near miss between an airliner and an Air Force
bomber which resulted from a failure of the air carrier crew to maintain
separation and the failure of the two controllers to coordinate their infor-
mation and actions with respect to the two aircraft. In two other enroute
collisions,"6 the government was found liable for its failure to notify the
air carrier of the use of a military instrument approach procedure in the
federal airway used by civil aircraft and, in the second case, for the failure
of a radar controller to transmit a timely warning to the air carrier aircraft
of the presence of a National Guard jet aircraft being operated under
visual flight rules.
In two control zone mid-air collisions," the court found substantial
evidence of negligence in the failure of a controller to warn the pilot in
the first case of possible danger from the other aircraft and, in the second
case, in issuing misleading information to one of the pilots involved. The
court disposed of the government's defense of VFR conditions and the
consequent responsibility of the pilots to provide separation between the
two aircraft by finding that the pilots were following properly and
promptly the ATC clearances issued to them. The damages awarded in the
latter case could be construed as a judicial compromise in that the amount
granted was $30,000, and the decedent was a 42 year-old man earning
$5,000 per annum who had left a widow and a nine year old daughter.
While disputes may arise with respect to the evidence of government
negligence or the judicial reasoning in some of these cases in which the
government was held liable for the negligent performance of its ATC
aircraft separation function, it should be noted that, in general, these
decisions recognized that the air traffic controllers were required to perform
their duties in accordance with the FAA ATC Procedures Manual, that
this manual prescribed the government standard of care, and that the
pilots had a responsibility to maintain a lookout for and to avoid other
24 New York Airways v. United States, 283 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1960).
"5 236 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Va. 1964).
"°United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964); Meyer v. United States, 257
F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1966).
" Hochrein v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Pa. 1965). See also Union Trust v. United
States, 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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aircraft. Therefore, in this area of air safety, the basic principles governing
government responsibility have been generally accepted.
Proceeding now to the possible liability of the government for accidents
caused by weather conditions, the courts readily found in the earlier
cases that the government should not be held responsible for the failure
of controllers to prevent the operation of aircraft into hazardous weather
conditions. Thus, a district court denied recovery on a claim based upon
the tower controller's issuance of a takeoff clearance in instrument flight
conditions when the pilot did not have an instrument rating.28 In a similar
case, involving an ATC visual flight rules clearance for an approach to a
landing in IFR conditions, the court denied recovery. " The same result
was reached in a case based on the in-flight breakup of a Cessna which
resulted when the pilot became disoriented upon entering a solid overcast.
The VFR pilot was being provided radar assistance for an approach in IFR
conditions. The court followed the reasoning of the two earlier decisions,
the Martens and Smerdon cases, in concluding that the approach controller
owed no duty to determine either the qualifications of a pilot to follow
clearances for a type of flight requested by a pilot or whether the aircraft
was suitably equipped for that type of flight."
The government was also absolved in two recent cases involving airplane
crashes in unfavorable weather conditions."2 Most of these cases referred
specifically to the standards and procedures prescribed in the ATC manual
in determining the extent of duties owed by air traffic controllers to pilots.
In the cases where the court found that, under the circumstances, the
controller owed a duty to furnish weather information, the court never-
theless denied recovery when it found that the failure to furnish such
information was not a proximate cause of the accident.
The responsibility of the government for the furnishing of weather
information to pilots was the key feature of the Second Circuit decision
in the Ingham case, 2 involving the crash of an Eastern DC-7 in the course
of an instrument approach. The tower controller had advised the pilot of
the 200 foot ceiling and one mile visibility but did not later advise him
that the visibility had decreased to three quarters of a mile. The court
interpreted the ATC manual requirement for the furnishing of a "report
of current weather conditions and subsequent changes, as necessary" to
require a report to the pilot of the change in visibility to three quarters of
a mile. The court made this finding despite the fact that the FAA speci-
fied minimums for the approach being executed fixed one half mile as the
required visibility and the air carrier's manual, in accord with the FAA
regulation, required ,execution of a missed approach only when visual
contact had not been established, or it had been lost after descent to mini-
mums, thereby indicating that the air carrier pilot would have descended
2Martens v. United States, 5 Av. Cas. 17,465 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
"Smerdon v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 929 (D.C. Mass. 1955).
'
0 Kullberg v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
asSomlo v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. 111. 1967); Devere v. United States, 268 F.
Supp. 226 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
32 Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
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to his minimums in any event. On this point of causation, the court con-
cluded that the change in visibility was information "the crew would have
considered important both in determining whether to attempt a landing,
and in preparing for the weather conditions most likely to be encountered
near the runway. '
A very recent decision on the government's duty to furnish weather
information was issued by the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia."4 Suit was brought by the administratrix of the first officer
of a Mohawk Airlines Martin 404 which crashed on takeoff in a thunder-
storm. The crew had been advised of the approaching thunderstorm but
was not later told that the storm had actually reached the airport. The crew
had requested a clearance for a turn "as soon as practical" after takeoff
"to avoid those thunderstorms coming in from the west." The clearance
was granted. The court found the government negligent in not telling the
pilot the thunderstorm was on the airport. In reaching this conclusion, the
court stated:
The Government had a duty to provide the taxiing plane with all signif-
icant relevant weather information. This duty existed whether or not specific
regulations or operating practices required that particular weather informa-
tion be transmitted. If the Government has new, significant, and immediate
relevant information that might have affected the crew's takeoff decision,
and there was opportunity to provide it after the plane left the ramp, then
the Government will be held liable, even though the regulation did not
explicitly require the information to be transmitted."
In refusing to use the ATC manual as the standard of care governing the
operations of FAA controllers, the court cited the Hartz case," a wake
turbulence case which will be discussed later. Since First Officer Neff was
conducting the takeoff, the court was faced with the defense of contribu-
tory negligence, a total bar under applicable statutory law. The court
determined from the request for a left turn that the crew did not realize
that the thunderstorm was on the field. The court also determined that the
decision to abort the takeoff was the responsibility of the captain, not the
first officer. In reaching its conclusion on the crew's lack of knowledge of
the location of the thunderstorm, the court stated:
It is highly questionable that the crew was aware that the rain wall
contained a thunderstorm or were aware of the speed of its approach. Engine
noises of a piston plane could muffle thunder noise; there were apparently no
thunderclaps but only rolling thunder sounds. There was no evidence of
lightning on the runway. Lightning may not have been particularly apparent
to the crew whose view was adversely affected by the heavy rain on the wind-
shield. It is difficult to judge speed of storms when in a cockpit on a runway."'
8' Id. at 235.
"
4 Neff v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 910 (D.D.C. 1968).
5Id. at 917.
"6 Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968). Another recent decision in which the
performance of a tower controller was judged by a standard not prescribed by an FAA manual is
Stork v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Cal. 1967). Government negligence was found in
the issuance of a clearance for a takeoff into extremely bad weather conditions. The ATC manual
provisions did not authorize the controller to deny clearance under the applicable circumstances.
"
T Neff v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 910, 920 (D.D.C. 1968).
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The last principal area of government responsibility involves wake
turbulence. The problem of wake turbulence has grown with each court
ruling on the subject. Wake turbulence, or as it is sometimes called, wing
tip vortex, is created by the lift action of aircraft wings. The two vortices
created by large transport aircraft in taking off and landing can produce
excessive rates of descent and uncontrollable rolling movements in light
aircraft. Their location and duration, after a short period of time, are
extremely difficult to forecast with any accuracy.
The first case on the subject of wake turbulence resulted in a decision in
favor of the government but contained a clear warning of future diffi-
culties.38 The pilot of the light aircraft which crashed in a landing attempt
employed improper techniques and did not comply with the traffic pattern.
The court found the crash was caused solely by his negligence and denied
recovery to all plaintiffs, including the passengers. However, the court
did state that a duty existed on the part of the air traffic controller to con-
sider wake turbulence in the issuance of air traffic clearances, even though
the ATC manual was completely silent on the subject. In a similar case, in-
volving an enroute encounter with wake turbulence, the court found insuf-
ficient evidence to establish that the government's failure to warn a private
pilot of the activities of large military aircraft around an airport was the
proximate cause of the accident."
Subsequent to these two accidents, the ATC manual was revised to
provide for a wake turbulence warning by the controller when he believed
turbulence might be present. The first decision subsequent to this revision
involved a takeoff accident in wake turbulence after the warning had been
provided in accordance with the manual.'0 The Ninth Circuit Court held
that the controllers should have provided a second warning when they saw
that the aircraft was starting its takeoff in disregard of the first warning.
The Furumizo decision in the Ninth Circuit was followed by the
Fifth Circuit in the Hartz case."' A warning was given to the Bonanza
pilot by the controller, but unlike the Furumizo circumstances, the phrase-
ology prescribed by the manual was not followed. Although the DC-7
which caused the wake turbulence passed directly in front of the Bonanza
in its takeoff, the court found that the warning of "prop wash" was insuf-
ficient to warn the pilot of the hazard created by the DC-7. The court
then determined that the controller was "better qualified by training, ex-
perience and vantage position to estimate time and distance and it was
his duty to direct and guide the Bonanza in a manner consistent with its
safety and the safety of all who might be affected by its operation. It was
the controller's responsibility to appropriately warn Hartz of the possible
danger of wing tip vortices from the large commercial airliner which was
departing immediately ahead of him."' 2 The court concluded that the FAA
controller owed a duty beyond those prescribed by the ATC manual and
s Johnson v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
'9 Wenniger v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964).4
°Furuzimo v. United States, 381 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1967).
4' Supra note 36.
42 387 F.2d at 873.
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that the lack of an appropriate warning imposed upon the controller "an
additional duty to delay takeoff clearance for the Bonanza for such period
as was reasonably necessary to permit such turbulence from the DC-7
to dissipate."
A wake turbulence case in which the controller failed to issue a warning
arose when a Bonanza crashed on a takeoff attempt in the wake turbulence
of a Constellation.' The Bonanza pilot had requested and obtained clear-
ance for an intersection takeoff, that is, a takeoff from a point down the
runway from the normal takeoff end. While the court denied recovery
for the pilot's estate, it did permit recovery to the passenger's estate on the
ground that the "collision hazards" from which controllers are required
under the ATC manual to separate aircraft include wing tip vortices.
Based on this interpretation of the manual, the court determined that the
controller had provided insufficient separation between the Constellation
and the Bonanza.
The government has been attempting to acquire knowledge on the
scientific phenomenon of wake turbulence for a substantial period of time.
In a January, 1964 report prepared by the Douglas Aircraft Company
under FAA contract it was concluded, based on flight test measurements
of vortices shed from a DC-8 aircraft during takeoff and landing, that:
(1) A fairly elaborate experiment would be required to verify general
theory for vortex displacement and decay because of extreme sensitivity to
low level wind conditions.
(4) Recommendations for improved separation criteria were not warranted
as a result of this investigation.44
The tests and measurements of vortices have continued since the date
of this report. However, efforts by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the Federal Aviation Administration, and government
contractors have not resulted, to date, in disclosing appropriate separation
standards for use by FAA controllers in the provision of air traffic control
services to aircraft.
11 Wasilko v. United States (M.D. Ohio 1967).
44 Report No, RD-64-3, Project No. 101-24R, Contract No. FA-WA-4306 at 41,
[Vol. 34
